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Abstract The Syrian conflict has brought into sharp focus the exercise of the veto by
some permanent members of the Security Council, highlighting significant shortcom-
ings in the Council’s ability to respond effectively to grave humanitarian situations,
particularly those involving mass atrocity crimes. It has also raised issues of legitimacy
and credibility in Security Council decision-making, yet a growing clamour within the
General Assembly for veto reform has, to date, not resulted in tangible change. The
purpose of this article is to examine how the Security Council can improve the effec-
tiveness of its response to humanitarian concerns but still maintain its position at the
centre of the response to threats to international peace and security.We explorewhether
the Uniting for Peace Resolution can provide a constitutional response to negating the
exigencies of the veto and enhance legitimacy in SecurityCouncil decision-makingwhilst
keeping the Security Council at the centre of the solution. As a practical remedy to
unblocking the Security Council in limited circumstances, we advocate an approach
which maintains the constitutional balance of power under the United Nations Charter
by placing the Security Council, as the body tasked with primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, at the centre of the operation of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution by determining when its use is appropriate and what
measures will be adopted as a consequence. We propose the use of independent mon-
itoring and verification bodies to carry out fact-finding and objective evaluation to
strengthen the legitimacy of Uniting for Peace.
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1 Introduction
On 12 April 2017, Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council, vetoed a draft resolution condemning the deadly
chemical attack in Syria.1 It was the eighth time since the beginning of
Syria’s six-year-old war civil war that Moscow had used its veto power
to block Security Council action in response to the ongoing conflict.2
On 28 February 2017, for instance, Russia, along with China, vetoed a
draft Security Council resolution that sought to impose sanctions
against parties using chemical weapons in Syria during the civil war.3
And, on 22 May 2014, Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution
condemning ‘the widespread violations of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and pro-government
militias, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law by non-State armed groups’ and
referring the situation in Syria to the prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court.4
These are just three examples of Russia, along with China at times,
blocking the Security Council from responding to the grave violations
of humanitarian law and human rights law in the Syrian civil war with
its use of the veto. There is much to deplore about the use of the veto
by Russia and China since the beginning of the conflict in Syria.
Whilst the use of the veto to prevent the passing of each resolution
was legal, it is certainly arguable that such use is inimical to the
drafters of the United Nations Charter (hereinafter the Charter) who
expected the use of the veto to be responsible and for the purpose of
1 Security Council Resolution 315, UN Doc S/2017/315 (12 April 2017); see also Security Council meeting
7922, UN Doc S/PV.7922 (12 April 2017).
2 Michelle Nichols, Russia Blocks U.N. Security Council Condemnation of Syria Attack (Reuters, 13 April
2017) \http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-vote-idUSKBN17E2LK[ accessed 15
April 2017.
3 Security Council Resolution 172, UN Doc S/2017/172 (28 February 2017); see also Russia, China Block
Security Council Action on Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria (UN News Centre, 28 February 2017)
\http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56260#.WLbc7IHyjIU[ accessed 28 February 2017.
4 Security Council Resolution 348, UN Doc S/2014/348 (22 May 2014); this resolution was supported by
sixty-four member states of the United Nations.
286 Graham Melling, Anne Dennett
123
ensuring international peace and security,5 and that it constitutes an
‘‘abuse’’ of the veto power.6
The issue of veto ‘‘abuse’’ has been the subject of much debate and
discussion within the United Nations organisation, member states and
civil society internationally.7 This has led to a range of proposals for
reform of the Security Council, be it structural reform, including the
Council’s composition, or reform of its decision-making procedures.8
However, while veto reform initiatives have gained momentum in the
last five years,9 they have not yet gained sufficient traction to guarantee
universal acceptance and assured implementation, particularly between
the permanent member states, amongst whom both Russia and the US
have expressed clear opposition to ‘tampering with the veto power.’10
The Security Council, therefore, due in large part to the veto power,
continues to reveal itself to be dysfunctional on important matters and
increasingly, states are despairing at its lack of response to the gravest of
situations.11 With the prospect of wholesale structural reform of the
Security Council being, at best, some time off and, more particularly,
change to Security Council voting procedure being unlikely, one is
5 The 1945 Joint Statement of the Four Sponsoring Governments envisaged that the veto would be
sparingly used and only on matters of importance and stated: ‘It is not to be assumed, however, that the
permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their ‘‘veto’’ power wilfully to
obstruct the operation of the Council.’ Statement of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting
Procedure in the Security Council, UNCIO Document 852, III/1/37(1) [8]/ UN Doc A/578 (7 June 1945).
6 However, notorious uses of the veto by Russia in recent years are not confined to Syria. In July 2015
Russia twice cast such vetoes: one which prevented the Security Council from adopting a resolution that
would have commemorated the 20th anniversary of the genocide at Srebrenica and a second that would
have established an international criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the downing of
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17. Security Council Report, The Veto (Research Report, 19 October 2015)
\http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-veto.php[accessed 16 August 2017, 1.
7 See, for example, UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked (UN News Centre, 15
March 2014) \https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47362#.WZlmsa2ZPR1[ accessed 20
August 2017; Amnesty International Annual Report 2014-2015 (Amnesty International, 2015) \https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2015/02/annual-report-201415/[ accessed 20 August 2017; UN:
Russia and China’s Abusive Use of Veto ‘‘Shameful’’ (Amnesty International, 28 February 2017)\https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/02/un-russia-and-chinas-abusive-use-of-veto-shameful/[ accessed
20 August 2017; Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurralde, Russian Vetoes Are Putting UN Security Council’s
Legitimacy at Risk, Says US (The Guardian, 23 September 2015)\https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-legitimacy-at-risk-says-us[accessed 20 August 2017.
8 See Section 4. For a brief discussion of reform proposals, see the New York University Center on
International Cooperation policy paper, Pathways to Security Council Reform (May 2014)\http://cic.nyu.
edu/publications/pathways-security-council-reform[accessed 20 April 2017; Security Council Report, supra
note 6.
9 See, for example, the strong support for veto reform in the report of Security Council meeting 7389 (23
February 2015) S/PV.7389.
10 Borger and Inzaurralde, supra note 7.
11 Ibid.
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prompted to look beyond the totem of Security Council reform, which
has become something of a ‘‘will-o-wisp.’’
In this article we shall examine whether the UN General Assembly’s
1950 resolution 377a(V): ‘‘Uniting for Peace’’ resolution (U4P) can be
used to unblock the Security Council in the face of the use of the veto
by a permanent member. We will examine whether U4P can provide a
legitimate framework to overcome Security Council veto-paralysis in
responding to mass atrocities today, importantly, ensuring Council
centrality in both responding to the veto through U4P and controlling
over the decision for any proposed action. This article will argue that it
is important, if resorting to Uniting for Peace, that any interpretation of
it must correctly reflect the constitutional balance of the Charter
between the Security Council and the General Assembly. It will be
argued that by adopting a particular reading of the Uniting for Peace
resolution, rather than being seen as a means of diminishing the
standing of the Security Council and its ‘‘primary’’ responsibility for
international peace and security, can be a mechanism for enhancing the
Security Council’s effectiveness in its response to mass atrocities, such
as have been and continue to be perpetrated in Syria.
Section 2 of this article outlines the creation of the veto power, its
purpose and scope. Section 3 examines examples of the use and ‘‘abuse’’
of the veto. Section 4 outlines current initiatives for reform of the veto
while Section 5 moves on to analyse the potential role for the ‘‘Uniting
for Peace’’ resolution, addressing in particular the question of its
constitutionality. We will examine whether the use of Uniting for Peace
can provide a constitutional response to negating the exigencies of the
veto, whilst keeping the Security Council at the centre of the solution,
thereby contributing towards repairing its already damaged legiti-
macy.12 Section 6 addresses the legitimate concern about the potential
abuse of the ‘‘Uniting for Peace’’ resolution and identifies an
instrumental role for both the Independent International Commission
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic13 and the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint
Investigative Mechanism14 to address such concerns. Section 7 contains
some concluding thoughts.
12 Ibid.
13 Established by OHCHR Res S-17/1, UN Doc S-17/1 (22 August 2011).
14 Established by Security Council Resolution 2235, UN Doc S/Res/2235 (7 August 2015).
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2 The creation of the veto, purpose and scope of the veto power
The first point to note is that there is no express reference to the veto
power of the Security Council permanent members in the Charter.
Instead, Article 27(1) allocates each member of the Security Council one
vote; Article 27(2) provides that procedural decisions of the Security
Council are to be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (i.e.,
they are not subject to the veto). By Article 27(3), decisions of the
Security Council on all non-procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members. The unanimous vote of permanent members plus
the agreement of four (originally two) non-permanent members is
needed and a negative vote by a permanent member on a substantive
matter will defeat the adoption of a resolution (although an abstention
by a permanent member is deemed a concurring vote15). The Charter
makes no constraints on how often or for what reason the veto power
may be used; nor does it create a framework of checks and balances or
require accountability. Hans Kelsen identifies the drafters’ missed
opportunity to restrict the negative effect of the veto: under Article 27
the voting procedure fails to distinguish between the ‘‘quasi-obligatory
and discretionary functions’’ of the Security Council in the Charter, and
Kelsen argues that the functions which the body ‘‘shall’’ perform could
have required a simple majority and only those which it ‘‘may’’ perform
could have required a qualified majority, so that the veto would only
apply to the latter.16 In contrast, the Charter clearly affords all decision-
making by the Security Council the greatest discretion and the
permanent members near complete control as a central plank of
maintaining international security, with the notorious downside that, as
Brierly notes, it ‘has resulted in a system that can be jammed by the
opposition’ of a single permanent member.17
The incorporation of the veto was clearly predicated on preserving
the wartime alliance of the great powers and maintaining their post-war
15 Following Security Council Resolution 4, UN Doc S/Res/4 (29 April 1946); see Constantin A
Stavropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under
Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, 61(3) AJIL (1967) 737, 742.
16 Hans Kelsen, Organization and Procedure of the Security Council of the United Nations, 59(7) Harvard
L R (1946) 1087, 1111; Kelsen also records how the French delegate at the San Francisco Conference
unsuccessfully proposed an amendment to the draft UN Charter borrowed from the League of Nations
Covenant, reserving to members of the UN the right to take such action as they considered necessary ‘in the
interests of peace, right and justice’ if the Security Council was unable to reach a decision. Ibid., 1115 fn 39).
17 J L Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 23 British Yrbk Intl L (1946) 83, 91.
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co-operation to produce unity and agreement, but this was one of the
flaws of the voting formula; it overlooked the potential for the veto to
be used for national interests, and fractures soon appeared in the
anticipated collegiality.18 With the implementation of the Charter, three
important unintended consequences became clear very early on: the
first was that the Security Council could be paralysed by inaction
through the veto. It soon became apparent that the exercise of the veto
by the permanent members was a problematic feature of Security
Council operation in achieving its primary aim of maintaining
international peace and security. In July 1946, Cuba proposed a general
conference to consider amending the Charter to remove the veto
power19 and Norman J Padelford, a member of the US delegation at
Dumbarton Oaks, wrote in 1948:
Both formal voting and the veto have been employed too often for the good of
the organization. The continual use of the veto has disheartened many who
hoped that the [Security] Council would be able to function more efficiently
than it has to date. It has prompted widespread desire to revise the Charter or
find other means of curtailing the veto ….20
The second consequence was that the support of a permanent member
for smaller States could lead to a ‘‘patron-and-client attitude,’’21 thus
providing an umbrella of protection and potential impunity to less
powerful States such as we see with Syria. Third, Security Council
inaction could lead states to turn elsewhere for decisions to be taken or
to resort to self-help22 with the potential to undermine the Council’s
primary function.
However, a more recent issue has arisen that was not fully apparent
in the 1940s. The prime focus of the nascent Security Council was the
prevention of further inter-state wars but by the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, the field of operation of the Security Council saw
an expansion in scale and emphasis beyond the original range of
expectation of traditionally understood threats to international peace
and security to include humanitarian protection and human rights
18 As David Caron has pointed out, ‘Sometimes – and I would assert this is the case with the veto - the
potential to betray the promise is built directly and tragically into the organization.’ David Caron, The
Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87(4) Am J Intl L (1993) 552, 560.
19 See Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, 131\https://unyearbook.un.org/[ accessed 4 September
2017.
20 Norman J Padelford, The Use of the Veto, 2(2) Intl Org (1948) 227, 246.
21 B A Wortley, The Veto and the Security Provisions of the Charter 23 British Yrbk Intl L (1946) 95, 105.
22 Ibid; see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
(International Development Research Centre 2001) XIII [F].
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abuses in internal conflicts.23 This development of emphasis on
responding to ‘‘human tragedy’’ caused by conflict ushered in the
potential for greater interventionism, which in turn raised a more
complex mesh of interlinking and, at times, conflicting norms and
principles. Whilst being expected to do more to respond to the
unfolding international crisis and human tragedy, due in large measure
to the exercise of the veto by the permanent members, the Security
Council can seem to be doing less, or at best, not enough.
3 A ‘‘prisoner of the veto’’?
At ameetingof the SecurityCouncil in 2010, the representative ofVenezuela
referred to the Security Council as ‘a prisoner of the right of the veto,’ calling
for the right of the veto to be eliminated and binding force given to decisions
of the General Assembly.24 Looking at the veto records, it is not difficult to
see why. Between 1946 and February 2017, 240 vetoes were cast by the
permanent members.25 Themost prolific casting of the veto has come from
Russia (combinedwith theUSSR)with a total of 107 vetoes cast; followed by
the USwith 79; the UKwith 29; Francewith 16 and Chinawith 11. Despite a
substantial decrease in the overall number of vetoes cast by the permanent
members from 2000 to 201726 (the total is fewer than half those cast in the
previous 54 years, a trend noted byWouters andRuys as being ‘all themore
remarkable as the number of resolutions adopted by the Council has
increased dramatically’27), the veto has still remained a substantial difficulty
in the functioning of the Security Council. At a Security Council session in
2015, the representative of New Zealand stated:
… the use of the veto or the threat of the veto is the single largest cause of the Security
Council being rendered impotent in the face of too many serious international
conflicts. Whether we are talking about Syria or the Middle East peace process, the
veto’s impact today far exceeds what was envisaged in the United Nations Charter —
to the huge detriment of the Council’s effectiveness and credibility.28
23 For example, see Security Council Resolution 794, UN Doc S/Res/974 (1992); Caron, supra note 18,
552 fn 3.
24 Security Council meeting 6404, UN Doc S/PV.6404 (18 October 2010) (Resumption 1) 22.
25 Veto List (Dag Hammarskjold Library) \http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick[ accessed 16
August 2017.
26 The number of vetoes cast by the permanent members between 2000 and 2107 is: Russia, 15; US, 11;
China, 8; UK and France, 0.
27 Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century? Egmont Papers
Academia Press for the Royal Institute for International Relations (2005) 9.
28 Security Council meeting 7389, S/PV.7389 (23 February 2015), 9.
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The threat of the use of the veto and the ‘‘hidden veto’’ has been
particularly problematic in the context of Security Council responses to
international humanitarian crisis.29 For example, when the Security
Council considered acting in response to the developing Rwandan crisis
and eventual genocide, both France and the US threatened the use of
the veto. Moreover both countries used their influence through the
‘‘hidden veto’’ to influence the definition of the crisis to avoid the use of
the term ‘‘genocide.’’30 With regard to the conflict and unfolding
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, it was Russia and China that threatened
the use of the veto when the Security Council began deliberating what
actions to take. Russia committed itself to vetoing any possible
enforcement action against its ally, Serbia, and China was unwilling to
extend the limits of the Charter on the use of force, thus impelling
NATO to take unilateral action with a bombing campaign in Kosovo
which was not authorised by the Security Council.31
With respect to the Syrian conflict, Russia has exercised its veto eight
times, blocking the following draft resolutions: in October 2011, demanding
an end to human rights violations;32 in February 2012, a draft resolution
holding the Syrian Government to account for human rights violations;33
in July 2012, demanding Syria’s urgent implementation of the Joint Envoy’s
six-point peace plan (including a ceasefire), renewing the mandate of the
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) and threatening
sanctions;34 in May 2014, a draft resolution referring the situation in Syria
to the International Criminal Court (supported by all other members of the
Security Council);35 in October 2016, demanding cessation of air strikes on
Aleppo;36 in December 2016, demanding a seven day cessation of hostilities
29 The ‘‘hidden veto’’ involves a permanent member, most often behind closed doors, threatening to use
the veto if a particular issue is brought before the Security Council. Due to the clandestine nature of the
exercise of the hidden veto, it is difficult to assess with accuracy the effect the veto has had on the decisions
the Security Council has made, or has not made. See Wouters and Ruys, supra note 27, 9.
30 Wouters and Ruys, supra note 27, 17; Chelsea Koester, Looking beyond R2P for an Answer to Inaction
in the Security Council, 27(3) Florida J Intl L (2015) 377, 382; for a detailed criticism of the Security Council
response to the Rwandan genocide see: Security Council Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions
of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc S/1999/1257 (16 December 1999).
31 Wouters and Ruys, supra note 27, 9.
32 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2011/612 (4 October 2011).
33 Security Council Resolution (draft), (UN Doc S/2012/77 (4 February 2012).
34 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2012/538 (19 July 2012).
35 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2014/348 (22 May 2014); Russia, China Block Security
Council Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court (UN News Centre, 22 May 2014)\http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#[ accessed 19 August 2016.
36 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2016/846 (8 October 2016).
292 Graham Melling, Anne Dennett
123
in Aleppo;37 in February 2017, a draft resolution seeking to impose
sanctions on any party to the civil war involved in the use of chemical
weapons;38 and most recently, in April 2017, a draft resolution requesting
full support be given to an investigation into the reported use of chemical
weapons on 4 April 2017.39 China exercised its veto on six of those
occasions, abstaining on the October 2016 and April 2017 drafts.40
However, inaction at these junctures has its consequences. As Ruth
Wedgwood points out, ‘Council action influences what our perception of
the law is.’41 There is evidence of escalations in the conflict after exercises
of the veto on Syria42 and, according to the International Commission of
Inquiry on Syria, there has been ‘‘a growing culture of impunity.’’43 The use
37 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2016/1026 (5 December 2016).
38 SecurityCouncil Resolution (draft), UNDoc S/2017/172 (28 February 2017); Russia, China Block Security
Council Action on Use of ChemicalWeapons in Syria (UNNews Centre, 28 February 2017)\http://www.un.
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56260#.WZR2Ma2ZPR0[accessed 28 February 2017.
39 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2017/315 (12 April 2017).
40 It must be noted that there has not been a total absence of unanimity in the Security Council in relation to
Syria. The Security Council has unanimously supported a ceasefire, see Security Council Resolution 2042, UN
Doc S/Res/2042 (14 April 2012); established a framework for eliminating chemical weapons in Syria, see
Security Council Resolution 2118, UNDoc S/Res/2118 (27 September 2013); allowed humanitarian access, see
Security Council Resolution 2139, UN Doc S/Res/2139 (22 February 2014); called on states to prevent the
transfer of arms and funds to IS, see SecurityCouncil Resolutions 2199,UNDoc S/Res/2199 (12 February 2015);
condemned the use of chlorine gas, see Security Council Resolution 2209, UNDoc S/Res/2209 (6March 2015);
established a Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria,
see Security Council Resolution 2235, S/Res/2235 (7 August 2015); unanimously endorsed the Geneva
Communiqué and Vienna Process urging negotiation of a Syrian-led, political transition to end the conflict, see
Security Council Resolution 2254, S/Res/2254 (18 December 2015); endorsed the cessation of hostilities
agreement announced by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), see Security Council Resolution 2268,
S/Res/2268 (26 February 2016); the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) was set up in 2015; and
condemned attacks on medical facilities, see Security Council Resolutions 2286, S/Res/2286 (3 May 2016);
demandedUN access tomonitor evacuations fromAleppo, see Security Council Resolutions 2328, S/Res/2328
(19 December 2016); welcomed efforts by Russia and Turkey to end violence, see Security Council Resolution
2336, S/Res.233 (31 December 2016); following the Munich talks in February 2016, the US and Russia as co-
chairs of the ISSG announced a ceasefire task force, and cessation of hostilities commencedon 27 February 2016.
Rigorous diplomatic efforts continue to operate and intra-Syrian talks were held in Geneva in April 2016
facilitated by the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, with some agreement on the need for
transition, see Transcript of Press Remarks by Staffan de Mistura, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geneva (United
Nations Office at Geneva, 27 April 2016) \http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/
(httpPages)/000D36A774282696C1257FA3002BA4E4?OpenDocument[ accessed 16 August 2017; further
intra-Syrian negotiations were held in Geneva on 3March 2017 where the Security Council called on the Syrian
parties to fully implement a ceasefire and end ceasefire violations and ensure humanitarian access, see Security
Council Press Statement on Syria (United Nations, 10 March 2017)\https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/
sc12749.doc.htm[accessed 20 August 2017.
41 Ruth Wedgwood, Unilateral Action in the UN System, 11(2) EJIL (2000) 349, 356.
42 See Dr Simon Adams, Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council, (Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series No. 5 (March 2015)\http://www.globalr2p.org/media/
files/syriapaper_final.pdf[ accessed 16 August 2017.
43 HRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
UN Doc A/HRC/22/59 (5 February 2013), 2; see also HRC, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/31/68 (11 February 2016), 20–21
[148]; see also generally HRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/33/55 (11 August 2016).
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of the veto in such grave humanitarian crisis leaves the Security Council
inert in the face of terrible suffering inside Syria and the broader threat to
international peace and security. With its continued dysfunction, the
Security Council has an ever increasing deficit of credibility that is urgent
for it to address. As Mohammed Bedjaoui observed in 1994, the Security
Council ‘will not gain in credibility, authority and efficiency unless the
conviction takes root that it acts not as an institution above the Charter and
international law but as their servant.’44
4 Veto reform initiatives
There are a number of current initiatives calling for restraint in the use
of the veto in mass atrocity situations – the French Initiative, the
Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) Code of
Conduct and the Elders’ Proposal.45 These initiatives are all motivated
by desire to improve the effectiveness of the Security Council in
preventing and halting mass crimes and their development has been
fuelled by Security Council’s inability to take effective action in Syria.
4.1 French initiative
In 2013 the French initiative was proposed which consists of the
permanent members adopting a ‘‘code of conduct’’ with respect to the
use of the veto.46 The code of conduct requires the permanent
members from refraining from using the veto when the Security
Council needs to make a decision with regard to mass atrocity crimes.
This restriction in the use of the veto, however, is caveated by the
question of whether the decision impacts upon the ‘‘vital interests’’ of a
permanent member. A key feature of the ‘‘code of conduct’’ is that it
would be triggered by the United Nations Secretary-General. This
would involve the Secretary-General making a determination regarding
the occurrence of a mass crime at the request of at least 50 member
states of the United Nations.
44 M Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts (M. Nijhoff,
Leiden/Boston, 1995) 7.
45 See generally, Security Council Report, The Veto (No 3, 19 October 2015) \http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-veto.php[ accessed 23 August 2017.
46 See generally, Security Council Report, The Veto (No 3, 19 October 2015) \http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-veto.php[ accessed 23 August 2017.
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During 2015, France, along with Mexico, launched a ‘Political
Declaration on suspension of veto powers in cases of mass atrocity,’
open to all member states to support. As with the 2013 proposal the
political declaration is focused only on the five permanent members of
the Security Council and calls for voluntary restraint of the use of the
veto in cases of mass atrocities.47 The declaration asserts that ‘the
Security Council should not be prevented by the use of veto from
taking action with the aim of preventing or bringing an end to situations
involving the commission of mass atrocities,’ going on to, ‘welcome and
support the initiative by France, jointly presented with Mexico, to
propose a collective and voluntary agreement among the permanent
members of the Security Council to the effect that the permanent
members would refrain from using the veto in case of mass atrocities.’48
4.2 Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) Code
of Conduct
The ‘Code of conduct regarding Security Council action against
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes,’49 (hereinafter the
‘‘code of conduct’’) calls on member states to make a series of pledges to
support the Security Council taking ‘‘timely and decisive’’ action to
prevent or end the perpetration of the core international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in particular calling
upon Security Council members to refrain from voting ‘against credible
draft Security Council resolutions that are aimed at preventing or
ending those crimes, which are all well defined in international law.’50
Distinct from the French initiative, the ACT pledges are directed to the
UN membership at large and are not confined to the permanent
members, as all member states are eligible to serve on the Security
Council as elected members. Also in contrast to the French initiative,
there is no explicit procedure for triggering the code of conduct.
47 France and the UN Reform (Permanent mission of France to the United Nations in New York, 27 April
2017)\https://onu.delegfrance.org/France-and-UN-Reform[ accessed 12 July 2017.
48 Political Statement on the Suspension of the Veto in Case of Mass Atrocities\https://onu.delegfrance.
org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf[ accessed 12 July 2017; As of 27 June 2017,
the Political Declaration is supported by 93 member states. See UN Security Council Code of Conduct (Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect) \http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_
code_of_conduct[ accessed 12 July 2017.
49 General Assembly and Security Council 70th Session Strengthening of the United Nations System UN
Doc A/70/621–S/2015/978 (14 December 2015), agenda item 122; see generally, Security Council Report,
The Veto (No 3, 19 October 2015) \http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-
veto.php[ accessed 23 August 2017.
50 Ibid.. A/70/621–S/2015/978, agenda item 122.
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Instead, ‘[t]he application of the code of conduct would be triggered by
any situation involving those crimes — in other words, when the facts
on the ground lead to Security Council action, following an assessment
of relevant information by a State committed to the code of conduct.’51
However, the Secretary-General would serve as an important authority,
using the capacities and expertise of the UN system, to bring such
situations to the attention of the Security Council, with his or her
assessment of the situation carrying great weight.52
4.3 Elders’ proposal
The Elders consist of a diverse and independent group of global leaders
working to promote peace and human rights, currently chaired by
former Secretary General Kofi Annan. In its proposals it called for the
permanent members to commit to not use, or threaten to use, their
veto where a decision is needed for the Security Council to respond to
the perpetration or threat of mass atrocities.53 Under the Elders’
proposal, where a permanent member does cast a veto in such cases
then it is incumbent upon the member to explain, clearly and publicly,
what alternative course of action they propose as a credible and efficient
way to protect the populations in question. This explanation, the Elders
assert, ‘must refer to international peace and security, and not to the
national interest of the state casting the veto, since any state casting a
veto simply to protect its national interests is abusing the privilege of
permanent membership.’54 Moreover, when one or more permanent
members do feel obliged to cast a veto, and do provide such an
explanation, the others must undertake not to abandon the search for
common ground but to make even greater efforts to agree on an
effective course of action.55
A key feature of each of these initiatives is the reliance upon a
political commitment from the permanent members addressing the
manner and circumstance in which the veto is to be employed.
However, a lingering question remains: what can be done when, as is
51 Ibid.
52 As of June 22 2017, the Code of Conduct is signed by 111 member states and 2 observers; see UN
Security Council Code of Conduct, supra note 48.
53 See generally, Security Council Report, The Veto (No 3, 19 October 2015) \http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-veto.php[ accessed 23 August 2017.
54 Strengthening the United Nations (Statement by the Elders, 7 February 2015)\http://theelders.org/
sites/default/files/2015-04-22_elders-statement-strengthening-the-un.pdf[ accessed 12 July 2017.
55 Ibid, 54.
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the case currently, these sensible, reasonable proposals fall upon deaf
ears among some permanent members? As we noted at the outset of
this article, these and other attempts either to engage in structural
reform of the Security Council or to influence the permanent members’
use of the veto power have come to naught, as exemplified by the
Security Council’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the catastrophe that is
Syria. Moreover, some permanent members have made clear their
opposition to reform of their veto power. Notably, in November 2016
in the General Assembly debate on Security Council reform, the then
US Ambassador to the UN stated that the United States opposed ‘an
expansion or alteration of the veto’; similarly the Russian Ambassador
asserted that any reform proposals ‘infringing on the rights of the
current five permanent members — including their historic right to the
veto — were unacceptable.’56
The Security Council needs to address the ineffectiveness and
deadlock caused by permanent member use or ‘‘abuse’’ of the veto. As
Samantha Power, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
in 2015 in relation to Russia’s use of its veto against Security Council
resolutions on Syria: ‘It’s a Darwinian universe here. If a particular body
reveals itself to be dysfunctional, then people are going to go
elsewhere’57 and there is recent evidence of an impetus towards more
robust General Assembly involvement. In 2016, Canada, on behalf of
sixty-nine member states, wrote to the President of the General
Assembly referring to the Security Council’s ‘‘troubling’’ failure to
implement its responsibilities and requesting a plenary session on the
situation in Syria.58 In December 2016, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution demanding an immediate end to all attacks on civilians and
to all sieges in Syria, the immediate cessation of hostilities and
unconditional humanitarian access, and ‘expressing alarm that the
responsibility of the Security Council to ensure prompt and effective
action has not been further discharged,’ urging the Security Council to
further exercise its responsibility by addressing the crisis, and giving the
56 General Assembly Seventy-First Session, 42nd & 43rd meetings, UN Doc GA/11854 (7 November 2016)
\https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11854.doc.htm[ accessed 20 April 2017.
57 Borger and Inzaurralde, supra note 7.
58 Letter to the President of the General Assembly (14 October 2016)\http://www.un.org/pga/71/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/2015/08/Informal-briefing-on-the-situation-of-Syria.pdf[accessed 15 March 2017;
Canada’s approach was endorsed by 223 organisations calling on UN member states to request an Emer-
gency Special Session of the General Assembly, Uniting for Peace in Syria: Global Civil Society Appeal to UN
Member States (Human Rights Watch, 1 December 2016) \https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/
uniting-peace-syria-global-civil-society-appeal-un-member-states[ accessed 15 March 2017.
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Secretary-General 45 days to report on the implementation of the
resolution.59 In this next section we will turn to consider whether as an
augmentation of the initiatives and proposals just discussed, the 1950
‘‘Uniting for Peace’’ Resolution can provide a viable practical solution to
enabling the effectiveness of the Security Council. We argue below that
the use of Uniting for Peace could provide a constitutional response to
negating the exigencies of the ‘‘abuse’’ of the veto, whilst keeping the
Security Council at the centre of the solution, thereby contributing
towards repairing its already damaged legitimacy.60
5 A role for ‘‘Uniting for Peace’’?
The Uniting for Peace Resolution’s original purpose was to address the
failings of the Security Council in meeting its responsibility to maintain
international peace and security when faced with a veto by one of its
permanent members. More particularly, the resolution provided a
means of circumventing Security Council paralysis due to the ‘‘use’’ or,
as viewed by the wider international community, the ‘‘abuse’’ of the
veto power by the Soviet Union with respect to the conflict in Korea.
The General Assembly passed Resolution 377A(V), the Uniting for
Peace Resolution on 3 November 1950. The key provision is Part A
which states that the General Assembly:
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in
the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.61
U4P granted the UN General Assembly a key subsidiary role for the
maintenance of international peace and security when the Security Council
failed to exercise its primary responsibility. That the General Assembly has a
clearly articulated secondary responsibility upon which U4P can ground its
constitutional base is no longer controversial, as confirmed by the
59 General Assembly Resolution 71/30, UN Doc A/RES/71/130 (9 December 2016). By a vote of 122 in
favour to 13 against with 36 abstentions.
60 Borger and Inzaurralde, supra note 7.
61 General Assembly Resolution 377A(V) ‘Uniting for Peace,’ UN Doc 377A(V) (3 November 1950).
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International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case.62 The Court
stated definitively that whilst Article 24 of the Charter confers upon the
Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, this does not translate as ‘‘exclusive’’
responsibility, leaving the General Assembly with secondary responsibility.63
Under the Charter, where a matter is referred by the Security Council
to the General Assembly, under article 11(2) of the Charter the General
Assembly ‘may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security’ brought before it by the Security
Council and make recommendations regarding any such questions.
Importantly however where ‘‘action’’ is necessary, article 11(2) states
that a matter shall be referred to the Security Council. It has been a
source of controversy whether this means a resolution of the General
Assembly recommending enforcement action falls within the definition
of ‘‘action,’’ thereby making such a recommendation from the General
Assembly ultra vires. Some guidance of what the word ‘‘action’’ means
was provided in the Certain Expenses case but this did not go as far as
addressing whether forceful enforcement action fell within this
meaning.64
On its face U4P clearly authorises the General Assembly to take
action with respect to matters that under the Charter’s constitutional
balance are considered to be the preserve of the Security Council.65 In
particular where there has been a breach of the peace or act of
aggression, U4P grants to the General Assembly the power to
recommend the use of armed force.66 According to Carswell,
62 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion [1962] ICJ
Rep 151.
63 Ibid; see also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1949]
ICJ Rep 174; South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa), Preliminary Objections [1962] ICJ Rep 319. See also
John Quigley, UN Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage? 35 Tex Intl L J (2000) 129,
165; Frederic L Kirgis Jr, The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89(3) Am J Intl L (1995) 506, 532; for a more
recent examination of the constitutionality of U4P, see the detailed analysis of Carswell in Andrew J
Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 18(3) J Conflict and Security
L (2013) 453.
64 Carswell, ibid., 477.
65 The key provisions of the Charter for understanding the constitutional balance between the two bodies
are articles 10, 11 and 12 and 24. These provisions set out the functions and powers of both bodies.
According to J Quigley, for example, under U4P, ‘The U.N. General Assembly involved itself in dealing with
threats to the peace to a much greater extent than was contemplated by the drafters of the Charter.’ Quigley,
supra note 63, 164.
66 It is generally understood however that under article 11(2) of the Charter, where enforcement action is
deemed necessary in a binding sense, that the General Assembly is required to refer the matter to the
Security Council. Otherwise the General Assembly is free to make non-binding recommendations for
enforcement action in fulfilment of its secondary responsibility; Carswell, supra note 63, 474.
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[a]lthough the Charter subjects the Assembly to specific limitations regarding
matters that would tend to trespass upon the primary constitutional domain of
the Council, it places no arbitrary limits on the Assembly’s ability to recommend
a full range of measures – including force – in cases where the Council is unable
to fulfil its primary responsibility.67
Others disagree with this interpretation, however. Johnson argues, for
example, that the use of force recommended by the General Assembly
against the independence and territorial integrity of another state would
breach Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibiting the use of force.68
According to Johnson, this would be the case even if the purpose of the
recommendation was ‘to stop a genocidal State from murdering parts of
its own population.’ He continues, ‘… outside the self-defense context
and absent a Security Council Chapter VII use of force authorisation, it
is difficult to see how an Assembly recommendation that states use
force squares with the norm reflected in Article 2(4).’69
5.1 Ensuring the centrality of the Security Council
It’s clear that a principal objection to the use of U4P is that it upsets the
‘‘delicate balance of powers’’ between theGeneral Assembly and the Security
Council under articles 11(2), 12 and 24 of the Charter whereby the General
Assembly becomes involved in a usurpation of Security Council power. A
possible answer is to re-envisionU4P as amechanism of the Security Council
to enable the realisation of its responsibility, rather than a usurpation of the
power of the Security Council by theGeneral Assembly.70 Through this lens,
rather than the General Assembly making recommendations including for
the use of force, to member states, General Assembly recommendations
would be limited to legitimating the SecurityCouncil to take action in spite of
the use of a veto by a permanentmember. It would be for themember states
of the Security Council therefore to determine what action should be taken.
Such an approach seeks to respect the Charter’s balance of power between
67 Carswell, supra note 63, 477.
68 Larry D Johnson, Uniting for Peace: Does It Still Serve Any Useful Purpose? (American Society of
International Law, 15 July 2014)\https://www.asil.org/blogs/‘‘uniting-peace’’-does-it-still-serve-any-useful-
purpose[ accessed 28 February 2017.
69 Ibid.
70 The Council of American Ambassadors has suggested revising the Uniting for Peace Resolution to
enable the Security Council to invoke Responsibility to Protect by a two-thirds majority procedural vote
(with no veto) to ‘empower the General Assembly to: (1) establish a team to negotiate a political settlement,
and (2) encourage the use of sanctions and collective military force if needed to incentivize a resolution of
the conflict.’ Donald T Bliss, Strengthening the United Nations’ Peace and Security Mandate (The
Ambassadors Review, 2016) \http://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/
fall-2016/strengthening-the-united-nations-peace-and-security-mandate[ accessed 15 March 2017.
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the General Assembly and the Security Council and would promote the
Security Council as the primary body for the maintenance of international
peace and security.
There are a number of ways in which this could be achieved. To begin
with, in order to avoid any charge of acting ultra vires, it is important that
the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations under U4P
should be interpreted in line with the clear delineation of powers between
the General Assembly and the Security Council in the Charter. This would
mean that only when the Security Council has stopped ‘‘exercising’’ its
primary responsibility should the General Assembly take on its secondary
responsibility.71 This clearly begs the question: When has the Security
Council stopped ‘‘exercising’’ its primary responsibility and more particu-
larly, whether the use of the veto means the Security Council is no longer
exercising its primary responsibility? To this question, Carswell argues that
despite the claim that once the veto is cast the Security Council
automatically stops exercising its primary responsibility, it is not possible to
discount that the veto is a valid and legitimate procedure of the Security
Council under article 27(3) of the Charter. Moreover, the veto is
‘contemplated as an essential mechanism for the fulfilment of the Security
Council’s Chapter VII mandate,’72 therefore in itself the casting of the veto
does not equate to the Security Council no longer ‘‘exercising’’ its
responsibility. Rather, Carswell argues, the casting of the veto alone is a
‘necessary but not sufficient prerequisite’ for the exercise of the General
Assembly’s secondary responsibility under Uniting for Peace.73 In addition,
he suggests, it is necessary to determine that a permanent member’s use of
the veto was a failure to exercise its responsibility.74 Therefore, it is the
casting of the veto and the determination that the veto constitutes the
Security Council failing to exercise its primary responsibility that provides
the constitutional basis for the General Assembly asserting its secondary
responsibility under Uniting for Peace. If this is correct, then a key question
71 This is not to ignore the 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 136) in which the ICJ confirmed that the
practice of the United Nations had led to a modification of Article 12(1) permitting the General Assembly to
deal with a situation at the same time as the Security Council; see Carswell, supra note 63 [469]. Noteworthy
is that in the debate on General Assembly resolution 71/130 of 9 December 2016, the Syrian representative
argued that article 12 of the Charter precluded the Assembly from making recommendations on a matter
still being considered by the Security Council unless the Security Council makes an explicit request. See
General Assembly Seventy First Session, UN Doc A/71/PV.58, 3 (9 December 2016).
72 Carswell, supra note 63, 469.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid; Michael Ramsden, ‘‘Uniting for Peace’’ in the Age of International Justice, 42 Yale J Int L online
(2016) 1.
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becomes: Who then decides whether the Security Council has failed to
exercise its primary responsibility, due to an ‘‘illegitimate’’ use of the veto
that then triggers the resort to U4P?
The use of the veto presents a tension between the ideas of the
lawfulness of the use of the veto and its legitimacy.75 That the veto is
constitutional under the terms of the Charter is not questioned. Equally,
the view that the veto was intended as an integral part of the functioning
of the Security Council and its primacy is not controversial.76 But a
multitude of controversies and criticisms regarding the illegitimacy of the
veto’s use by permanent members has been ever present. It is this idea of
illegitimacy that is often characterised as veto abuse and the manner in
which a permanent member interprets how to exercise veto power gives
rise to multiple overlapping ideas of legitimacy: whether the use of the
veto is politically legitimate, morally legitimate or strategically legitimate.
Often when a use of the veto is damned for being illegitimate, it reflects
the view that there is something questionable politically, morally or
strategically with the decision taken.
Moreover, the question of legitimacy is a transmutable concept. Our
idea of what constitutes a legitimate use of the veto has changed with
the changing emphasis of the values of the international system more
acutely focussed today upon human rights and humanitarian protection
as a priority.77 For example, within the current socio-cultural context, a
use of the veto that hinders the pursuit of humanitarian goals is
considered an illegitimate use of the veto.78 In this regard, the General
Assembly has been particularly critical of the Security Council and its
inability to respond adequately to the Syrian crisis. While not legally
binding, such criticism can have trenchant moral and political force. At
the meeting of the 70th UN General Assembly in 2015, a number of
States condemned Russia’s use of the veto (including in relation to
Syria).79 The Assembly’s Resolution 71/130 expressed ‘outrage at the
75 For a scholarly analysis of the relationship between legality and legitimacy, see Jutta Brunnée and Stephen
J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (CUP, Cambridge, 2010).
76 Carswell, supra note 63, 469; Ramsden, supra note 74, 5; Philippa Webb, Deadlock or Restraint? The
Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria 19(3) J Conflict & Security L. (2014) 471.
77 The veto traditionally conceived, however, prioritises the pragmatics of power relationships within the
international system. Ibid., 76?
78 Ramsden, supra note 74, 6; see also, for example, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12545.doc.
htm.
79 Meeting of the 70th UN General Assembly in September 2015, General Debate of the 70th Session
(United Nations, 2015) \https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive[ accessed 20 August 2017; Jessica
Kroenert, UN Reform at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly (Center for UN Reform Education,
29 October 2015)\http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/680[ accessed 20 August 2017.
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escalation of violence’ in Syria, urging the Security Council to take
additional measures to address the ‘‘devastating humanitarian crisis’’ and
expressly stressing article 11 of the Charter.80
What constitutes a legitimate use of the veto by a permanent
member should, appropriately, be made by the Security Council. As
Carswell notes, for example: ‘[B]y virtue of the primacy bestowed by
articles 12 and 24, and the very construction of the Charter around the
nucleus of the Security Council… the appropriate forum to determine
that question [of legitimacy] must be the Council itself.’81 Moreover the
view of the legitimacy of the use of the veto can be expressed through
the Security Council’s use of U4P. It has long been decided that under
the Charter the ‘submission to the General Assembly of any question
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security’82 and a
‘request that the General Assembly make a recommendation on a
dispute or situation in respect of which the Security Council is
exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter’83 are procedural
decisions, which can be made on the basis of a two-thirds majority vote
(9 out of 15 members); and importantly, they are not subject to the veto
under Article 27(2). Moreover, U4P makes explicit the obligation of a
two-thirds majority for any referral of a matter to the General
Assembly.84 It can be argued therefore that in deciding to trigger U4P
and refer the matter to the General Assembly and in achieving a two-
thirds majority to do so, the Security Council is implicitly expressing its
view on the legitimacy of the use of the veto by a permanent member.85
6 Fear of abuse
A legitimate concern about the Security Council’s resort to the Uniting
for Peace resolution is that it could lead to abuse by powerful states.
U4P could be a vehicle for increased military adventurism associated
with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Already there exists concern and
some evidence that Security Council-authorised enforcement actions for
humanitarian purposes have been used as a pretext for wider political
80 General Assembly Resolution 71/130, UN Doc A/71/L.39 (7 December 2016).
81 Carswell, supra note 63, 472.
82 General Assembly Resolution 267(III), UN Doc A/Res/267(III) ANNEX Decisions deemed procedural
(14 April 1949).
83 Ibid.
84 Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note61, part A.
85 Carswell, supra note 63, 472.
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and strategic goals by the intervening states. A recent example of this
was the Security Council resolution authorising intervention in Libya in
2011 for humanitarian purposes;86 its use of the phrase ‘to take all
necessary measures’ was interpreted by the intervening states not only
as giving power to alleviate humanitarian suffering but also more
extensively to include the ultimate outcome of regime change within
Libya. The fall-out from this has been considerable. Russia and China,
who at the passing of Security Council resolution 1973 abstained, have
subsequently cited the potential for abuse of any resolution by
intervening states along the lines of the Libyan intervention when
vetoing or threatening to veto resolutions calling for Security Council
enforcement actions or any other meaningful response to the human-
itarian crisis in Syria. By negating the effect of the veto, it can be argued
that where Uniting for Peace is involved, the likelihood for abuse is
greater.
What is more, it could be said that any action taken in opposition to a
veto could cause serious political tensions between states and in
particular between permanent member states.87 This is even more the
case if military action is deemed necessary. It has been suggested that
when action is taken by some permanent members in direct opposition
to a veto of fellow permanent members, this weakens authority of the
Security Council as the ‘sole body capable of authorising use of force.’88
The unintended consequence of this could be to undermine the pre-
eminence of the Security Council as permanent members are ‘less likely
to view it as the ultimate authority if, upon failing to get its resolution
passed, other [permanent member] states will ignore that veto and
choose to act anyway.’89
Where legitimate fears of abuse of U4P exist, a possible answer to
such concerns could lie in the role to be played by an independent
monitoring and verification body. It is worth noting that in the original
U4P resolution there was a call for the establishment of a Peace
Observation Commission (the Commission). In its original guise under
U4P, the Commission ‘could observe and report on the situation in any
area where there exists international tension the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
86 Security Council Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/Res/1973 (17 March 2011).
87 Koester, supra note 30, 395.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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security.’90 Ultimately the Commission quickly fell away and beyond its
initial establishment was not subsequently reconstituted. However, that
does not negate the rationale for the role that such a body could have in
the scheme of things. The involvement of such an independent body
could play an important role in legitimating the resort to U4P by the
Security Council because it could militate against the potential abuse of
U4P by powerful states. It could be the case that where U4P is resorted
to, this decision must be based upon and supported by the evidence
provided by the reporting of such an independent body. Such reporting
would then feed into the decision to resort to U4P, which would require
a two-thirds majority of the Security Council to agree. Clearly, it would
be important for the body to be independent, non-political and with the
expertise, experienced and competent to make legal analysis.91
With respect to Syria, there already exist such bodies that have been
incredibly important for the purpose of collecting information and data
to document the many violations of international law and to support
future accountability efforts. Both the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic92 and the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-
United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism93 have been investigating
alleged violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law and to establish the facts and circumstances to such
violations and of the crimes perpetrated. However, despite both bodies
producing evidence of a large catalogue of violations of international
law, including the documented use of chemical weapons by the Syrian
government, the Security Council has been unable to take meaningful
action due to the use of the veto by Russia.94 Nevertheless, such
independent fact-finding and evaluation is seen as a key feature to
safeguarding the use of U4P. The important role of the monitoring
body would be to provide objective and neutral analysis of the facts,
establishing legal outcomes upon which political decisions could be
made, one of which may be the resort of the Security Council to the
90 Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 61, part B.
91 There have been a number of proposals reflecting similar ideas. As noted by Wouter et al, see, for
example, the European Union Parliament Proposal, Resolution on the relations between the European
Union and the United Nations, 2003/2049 (INI), 29 January 2004, O.J. (21 April 2004), C-96/79 [20].
92 Established on 22 August 2011 by OHCHR Res S-17/1, supra note 13.
93 Established by Security Council Resolution 2235, supra note 14.
94 See vetoes relating to chemical weapons in Section 3.
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Uniting for Peace resolution. This would confer added legitimacy upon
the decision by the Security Council to employ U4P.
7 Conclusion
In August 2012, then Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki
Moon said of the conflict in Syria that it is ‘a test of everything this
Organization stands for, I do not want the United Nations to fail that
test.’95 To date, the record of the United Nations’ Security Council and
its response to the ongoing humanitarian conflict in Syria has been
lamentable; due in large measure to the use or ‘‘abuse’’ of the veto
power by one or more permanent members of the Security Council,
namely Russia and China. This has included preventing the Security
Council from responding to a range of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including the confirmed use of chemical weapons by the
Syrian government against civilian targets.96
As a result there has been much hand-wringing about the role of the
Security Council and its effectiveness as the primary guardian of
international peace and security. The veto carries the lion’s share of the
blame for the ineffectiveness of the Security Council, giving rise to
understandable frustration. It is too often used, as Cox suggests, for
protecting countries with which the permanent members have close
political, economic or cultural ties and ‘most notoriously in the situations
of mass … killings.’97 In spite of this, one must concede though that the
veto does have a purpose. As discussed earlier, the veto was always
intended as a mechanism to safeguard the vital interests of the permanent
members, as the most important states, by guaranteeing peaceful relations
between them.98 Nevertheless, the veto was not intended to be a tool to
obstruct and frustrate the functioning of the Security Council in realising its
purpose to ‘maintain international peace and security.’99 This view,
according to Cox, is ‘consistent with the intentions of the original drafters
that the permanent members keep their power of the veto to protect their
95 As Syria Fighting Continues, General Assembly Urges Immediate Halt to Violence (UN News Centre,
3 August 2012) \https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42624&Cr=Syria&Cr1=#.
WMkpdfXXJdg[ accessed 18 August 2017.
96 See examples of vetoes in Section 3.
97 Brian Cox, United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences,
6(1) South Carolina J Intl Business L (2009) 89, 119.
98 Ibid, 120.
99 UN Charter 1 UNTS XVI (1945), article 1 [1] (Entry into force 24 October 1945).
306 Graham Melling, Anne Dennett
123
national interests while adhering to the principles of saving ‘succeeding
generations from the scourge of war’.100
There have been sustained calls for structural reform of the Security
Council and more limited plans for reform of the way in which the
permanent members should exercise their veto power. To date, no plan
for Security Council or veto reform has progressed beyond the
discussion stage and in the meantime the Security Council is obstructed
from responding effectively to grave humanitarian situations and in
particular those involving the perpetration of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Most of the veto reform proposals that have been
discussed here call for some form of restraint in the use of the veto.101
Voluntary restriction of the veto would be welcome. However, where
the restraint in the use of the veto does not occur, the purpose of this
article has been to examine the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness
of the Security Council in responding to grave humanitarian situations,
in particular involving the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, through the use of U4P. Importantly, the approach
advocated here places the Security Council, as the body tasked under
the UN Charter with primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, at the centre of its operation. Ensuring
Security Council centrality in determining both when it is appropriate
for U4P’s use and what measures will be adopted as a consequence
guarantees proper regard for the constitutional balance of the Charter.
The use of U4P is not the complete solution to these calls, and the need,
for Security Council reform, but, in the interim, it can be a practical
solution to unblocking the Security Council in some limited
circumstances.
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